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Recent Developments

State v. Cain:
Theft By Deception is Complete When the Respondent Obtains Control of the
Victims Property Through the Agency of a Common Carrier in Maryland
By Camela Chapman

T

he Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a
Maryland trial court has territorial
jurisdiction over a prosecution for
theft by deception in violation of
Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 342,
where a victim in Maryland was
deceived by an accused located in
Georgia, via the Internet, and thereby
induced to mail a check to the
accused in Georgia, in exchange for
goods, which, proved not to be as
the accused represented them. State
v. Cain, 360 Md. 205,757 A.2d 142
(2000). In so holding, the court has
established that to exercise
jurisdiction for the crime of theft by
deception, the essential element of
respondent obtaining control of a
subject's property is complete upon
the victim delivering the property
to an agent of the accused, in the
case at bar through the agency of
the U.S. Postal Service.
Respondent Mary Jean Cain
("Cain"), a resident of Georgia,
placed an advertisement on the
Internet to sell a "mint" collection
of ninety-five Barbie dolls in their
original boxes, stating that the dolls
and boxes were all in "collector's
condition." Debbie Ann Amyot
("Amyot"), a resident of Maryland,
saw the advertisement and responded
to it via Internet e-mail and telephone
calls to respondent's home in Georgia.
Amyot agreed to buy the entire doll

collection for $6,140. On August 28,
1998, Amyot mailed a check
payable to Cain in that amount to
Cain's home in Georgia. On
September 9, 1998, Amyot received
by mail thirty-six Barbie dolls in
boxes, all of which were in poor
condition, thereby having little
collector value. Amyot contacted
Cain and requested to return the
dolls. Cain terminated contact with
Amyot. Georgia police would not
investigate
because
the
investigation had been initiated in
Maryland.
On January 21, 1999, Cain was
charged under§ 342 in the District
Court of Maryland, with one count
of theft by deception of property
with a value of $300 or more.
Respondent moved to dismiss on the
ground that Maryland lacked
territorial jurisdiction. The district
court granted the motion. The State
appealed to the circuit court, which
affirmed the judgment. The State
petitioned the court ofappeals for writ
of certiorari.
The court began its analysis by
pointing out that neither the
Maryland Constitution nor the
Annotated Code of Maryland
addresses jurisdiction over the
offense of theft by deception. !d. at
211, 757 A.2d at 145. Therefore,
they turned to the common law. !d.
at 212, 757 A.2d at 145. The court

stated that the general rule under the
common law is that "a state may
punish only those crimes committed
within its territorial limits." Jd.
(citing Pennington v. State, 308
Md. 727, 730, 521 A.2d 1216,
1217 (1987)). Furthermore, the
court noted that it was clear under
common law that an accused's
actual presence in the state at the
time the crime was committed is
not necessary. Id. at212, 757 A.2d
at 146. When a crime transcends
state lines the court has to make a
determination of whether an offense
is committed within Maryland's
jurisdiction. Id. at 213, 757 A.2d
at 146. "Ifthe various elements of
a given offense do not all occur
within the borders of a single state,
it becomes necessary to decide in
which state the offense has been
'committed."' Id. at 213-214, 757
A.2d at 146. (citing Penningtion,
308 Md. at 730,521 A.2dat 1217).
The court noted that this
question has been decided in
various ways. ld. at 214,757 A.2d
at 14 7. Case law from other
jurisdictions has asserted, for
jurisdictional purposes, that a
crime may have several essential
elements, that where these occur in
several states, each such state has
jurisdiction. !d. After a review of
Maryland law and case law from
other states, the court stated that the
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 75
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essential element ofthe crime oftheft
by deception, for jurisdictional
purposes, is when the accused
obtains control of the subject's
property. !d. at 216, 757 A.2d at
147. Thus, ''the offender may be tried
where the property was obtained." !d.
at 216,757 A.2d at 148.
The court then reviewed case
law from other jurisdictions that
support the proposition that when
one uses deception to gain control
of another's property, and the subject
delivers the property by mail,
control is obtained when the
property is put in the mail. !d. at
216-217, 757 A.2d at 149. The
court pointed out that there was
some case law to the contrary,
saying that control is obtained when
actually received, not when mailed,
but the court rejected this view. !d.
at 218-219, 757 A.2d at 149. The
court stated that the better view of the
element of gaining control of the
property is accomplished by looking
at when the victim surrenders their
property to the control ofthe accused,
whether personally or through the
defrauding party's agent. !d. at 219,
757 A.2d at 149.
The court noted that "where
one absent from a state commits a
crime therein through an innocent
agent the absentee is liable in the
state in which the crime was
committed to indictment, trial and
conviction." !d. at 220, 757 A.2d at
150 (quoting Urciolo v. State, 272
Md. 607, 631, 325 A.2d 878, 892
(1974)). The court then went on to
state that this principle has been
applied in cases in which the innocent
agent was a common carrier, and the
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accused acts through the common
carrier, by requesting the property be
delivered to the carrier, to be shipped
to the accused outside the jurisdiction.
!d. at 220, 221, 757 A.2d at 151.
Relying upon the principle that an
accused obtains control when a victim,
relying on the accused's
representation, deposits the property
to the United States Postal Service,
an innocent agent or a common
carrier. !d. The court noted that under
Maryland statute, the check itself is
considered property and it does not
have to be cashed first to gain value.
!d. at 222, 757 A.2d at 151.
Finally, the court briefly
discussed the argument that the
federal statutes on mail and wire
fraud preempt state laws involving
the
mail
or
electronic
communications. !d. at 223, 757
A.2d at 151. The court again turned
to case law from other jurisdictions
that have held there was no
preemption, because there was "no
support for the proposition that the
federal interest in preventing fraud
or deception through the use of the
United States mails is so dominant
as to preclude any state laws on the
subject." !d. at223, 757 A.2dat 152
(quoting Conte & Co. v. Stephan,
713 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Kan.
1989)). The court adopted this view
and ruled that the federal statutes
criminalizing fraud by mail and wire
do not preempt § 342 as applied to
crimes involving the use of the mail
and/or telephone. !d. at 224, 757
A.2d at 152.
The holding in State v. Cain is
an important step taken in Maryland
in prosecuting residents from other

jurisdictions who deceive and/or
defraud Maryland residents of their
property via the Internet, telephone
and/or electronic communications,
when the property, is sent by mail or
common carrier from Maryland to
the accused out of state. This is
especially important with the
widespread use of the Internet.
Maryland resident will have judicial
recourse in Maryland, thus making it
more convenient for them to
prosecute, without having to travel out
of state to retrieve or receive
compensation for the stolen property.

